University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2012

Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary?
David A. Weisbach
dangelolawlib+davidweisbach@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Weisbach, "Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary?" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 601, 2012).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 601
(2D SERIES)

Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary?
David A. Weisbach

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
June 2012
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The University of Chicago, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES BE PRECAUTIONARY?
David A. Weisbach †
February 2, 2012
The precautionary principle requires that we take additional actions to prevent
harms when the harms from an activity are uncertain and possibly irreversible.
This paper considers whether environmental or other Pigouvian taxes should
similarly be precautionary. Should environmental taxes be set higher than
otherwise if harm from pollution is uncertain and irreversible and where we are
likely to learn more about the nature of the harm the future. It concludes that
environmental taxes should be set equal to expected marginal harm from pollution
given the currently available information and should be neither raised or lowered
because of the prospect of learning or irreversible harm. The reason is that taxes
equal to expected marginal harm decentralize decisions to market participants
who will, facing these taxes, make appropriate choices about the timing of
pollution. Taxes act similarly to property rights in a complete market where
market participants produce Pareto outcomes. There are a number of caveats to
this conclusion including the possibility of endogenous learning, in which our
understanding of the environmental effects of pollution or the available mitigation
technologies depends on the level of taxation.
Keywords: Pigouvian taxation, environmental taxation, precautionary principle,
climate change, real options, instrument choice
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†

Walter J. Blum Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, Senior Fellow, The
Computation Institute, The University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. I thank
Jacob Nussim, Julie Roin, and participants at a University of Chicago Law School workshop for
comments and Megan Stueck for research assistance.

There is a considerable body of work in environmental law and
environmental economics addressing the timing of pollution abatement when
there is uncertainty about the potential harms from pollution and when emissions
are irreversible. The core idea is that we might want to reduce pollution now more
than otherwise to preserve flexibility until we learn more about the size of the
harms and the likely abatement costs. As we teach our children, better safe than
sorry.
Environmental law implements this idea through the precautionary
principle. There are many statements, differing from one another in important
details. 1 A commonly used version can be found in the 1992 Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Article 3, which states that the parties “should
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing such measures.” A prominent legal scholar proposed the
following version which is more explicit and stronger:
when regulators are dealing with an irreversible loss, and when they
are uncertain about the timing and likelihood of that loss, they should
be willing to pay a sum – the option value – in order to maintain
flexibility for the future.
Sunstein (2006).
Environmental economists have analyzed the problem as one of decisionmaking under uncertainty and learning. 2 In the simplest, two-period models, for
example, emissions in the first period irreversibly affect the expected marginal
harm from emissions in the second period and we expect to learn more about the
harms and to be able to adjust the second period actions accordingly. Under some
circumstances, we might want to reduce first period emissions to retain flexibility
in the second period. More complex models include both irreversible harms and
1

The essays in Tickner (2003) and Fisher, Jones, and von Schomberg (2006) provide
summaries of the precautionary principle.
2

Papers include Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Kolstad (1996a, 1996b), Ulph
and Ulph (1997), Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000), Pindyck (2000), Pindyck (2002), Gollier and
Treich (2003), Ingham and Ulph (2005).
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irreversible expenditures on abatement, so that concerns about flexibility run both
ways. You have to be safe and not sorry about both potential environmental harms
and about the possibly of wasting resources on unnecessary abatement.
To my knowledge, this analysis has never been specifically applied to the
optimal timing of environmental (or other Pigouvian) taxes. 3 This is so even
though environmental taxes are thought by many to be the first best solution to
pollution problems, preferable to command and control approaches in many
contexts. The question I address is whether environmental taxes should be
imposed earlier or at a higher rate when there is an uncertain possibility of
irreversible environmental harms or later to allow society to learn about the likely
harms before regulating. Does a version of the precautionary principle apply to
taxes?
The thesis developed here is that as a first order matter, there is no tax
precautionary principle: the government should not set taxes to preserve
flexibility in the face of irreversible harms and learning. Environmental taxes
should be set equal to the expected marginal social harm from an activity,
adjusted in each period to reflect new information. The reason is that
environmental taxes decentralize decision making. They impose a price on harmcausing activities and let individual actors decide the appropriate level of the
activity given that price. Individual actors will take precautions if appropriate. We
can think of Pigouvian taxes as completing the market, and like in other situations
with complete markets, we rely on individuals to determine the appropriate level
and timing of their activities. The government should not additionally accelerate
or delay environmental taxes.
This statement is subject to a number of important caveats and limitations.
First, there are many versions of the precautionary principle. By saying that the
precautionary principle does not apply to taxes, I mean that taxes should not be
set higher or lower than the expected marginal harm because of precautionary

3

Ko, Lapan, and Sandler (1992), Ulph and Ulph (1994), and Farzin (1996) consider the
timing of Pigouvin taxes but do not model the choice of irreversible emissions when there is
learning. Pindyck (2002) (p. 1696) indicates that he believes the solutions to the optimal timing
problem apply to taxation, but it appears that he assumes that taxes must be adopted on a onceand-for-all basis and can never be adjusted. This case may have optimal timing elements that are
different than flexible taxes. Section 5 discusses this issue.
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motives. Some versions of the precautionary principle may merely require the use
of expected values and, therefore, are consistent with such taxes.
Second, it might seem that because there is no tax precautionary principle,
the information requirements for taxes would be lower than for other regulatory
mechanisms: the claim would be that we do not have to solve the optimal timing
problem to set the tax because it is based on expected values. This is not correct.
To determine expected marginal harm from an activity, the government needs to
understand the extent to which individual actors take precautions. The reason is
that for stock pollutants, the marginal harm from current emissions depends on
the stock of emissions in the future. This in turn depends on the level of
precaution that individual actors take. Therefore, to determine the marginal harm
from current emissions, the government must know how individuals respond to
uncertainty, irreversibility, and learning. The government cannot simply ignore
these problems because it is using taxes even though taxes should be set equal to
expected marginal harm.
Third, optimal Pigouvian taxes are equal to the current estimate of marginal
harm given the then-available information. If taxes do not adjust to new
information, they will often be too high or too low, giving rise to timing
considerations similar to the precautionary considerations that arise in command
and control regimes.
Finally, the basic analysis assumes that information arrives exogenously.
The price on pollution, however, may affect the pace of technological
development. The interaction between technological development and Pigouvian
taxes is complex because general technology policies such as research and
development incentives will often apply to abatement technologies. Setting
abatement policies to, say, increase the pace of technological development may
not be appropriate if general technology policies already cause individuals to fully
internalize positive externalities from technological development.
The paper comes in six parts. Part 1 provides three motivating examples.
Part 2 sets forth a two-period model to capture the idea of decision-making when
there is an uncertain but irreversible harm where we will learn more about the
harm in the future. Part 3 considers the solution to the model in three
circumstances: (i) as a problem of consumer behavior; (ii) an externality solved
by taxation; and (iii) an externality solved by tort liability or by specifying
property rights. It shows that if taxes are based on expected harm, actors will be
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behave the same was as when the problem is one of consumer behavior. Torts and
property rights can achieve the same result, so that Pigouvian taxes, torts, and
property rights should be seen as substitutes for one another. Part 4 then examines
how the tax solution to the model compares to the precautionary principle. Part 5
considers caveats and extensions to the model. Part 6concludes.
1.

Motivating examples

I begin with three examples to motivate the analysis. The first is based on
Arrow and Fisher (1974), which originated much of the relevant literature. They
consider the choice to clear cut and develop a virgin redwood forest. Once the
forest is cut, it cannot be restored within a reasonable time period, so the
development decision is irreversible. Moreover, the value of the developed land
will change as will the value of the land in its undeveloped state, and the owner
will learn these values with the passage of time. The question is when the owner
should develop the land, if ever. Arrow and Fisher seem to have in mind a public
choice about the timing of this decision. If, however, the decision maker is the
owner of the property and there are no externalities (none are specified), the
decision can be viewed as a problem of consumer choice.
The second example is similar but has a clear harm to a third party.
Consider a downstream owner of land who wants to build a dam on a stream or
river abutting his property. Building the dam, however, will flood upstream
property owners, permanently destroying their property. We do not know the
future value of the destroyed property, nor do we know the future value of the
benefits from the dam (such as flood control, power, and irrigation). The owner
has to decide whether to build the dam now or wait. Although we might classify
this problem as one of natural resource use, it has the same structure as
environmental problems.
The final example is climate change. Carbon has a very long atmospheric
life. For policy purposes, substantial portions of it can be treated as staying in the
atmosphere indefinitely and there is no way to remove it. Marginal harm from
emissions goes up with the stock of emissions, so that emitting a unit of carbon
today increases the marginal harm from emissions in the future and this effect
may be highly nonlinear. We do not, however, currently know the harm that a unit
of emissions will cause and, moreover, we do not know the costs of abatement in
the future. The question is whether we should reduce emissions more today
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because of this uncertainty or perhaps wait to reduce emissions because of the
same uncertainty.
In all three examples, current decisions inalterably affect the future but the
amount of the resulting harm is unknown. In deciding what to do now, therefore,
we have to consider the future effects. This structure describes some but by no
means all pollution or natural resource problems. Many pollutants only affect the
immediate period and then dissipate. For example, the release of a toxic chemical
might cause immediate harm and the chemical might then degrade or be absorbed
into the environment. Uncertainty about these sorts of flow pollutants might affect
how much care is taken for example because of risk aversion. The focus here is on
the first type of problem, where emissions today affect the value of actions in the
future.
2.

A Simple Model of the Problem

We want to model the choices in these examples in the simplest possible
setting that reflects both that the acivity results in permanent harm and that we
will learn more about the size of that harm in the future. Much of the literature has
focused on a model in which an actor/polluter has to determine a level of activity
and resulting emissions ei in each of two periods. 4 Emissions in the first period
cause damages of an unknown quantity in the second period and cannot be
reversed. Before deciding on second period actions, however, the actor learns
more about the harm from emissions and can adjust, such as by engaging in less
of the activity if damages turn out to be high or by increasing the level of activity
if damages turn out to be low.
Let θ (δ e1 + e2 ) be stochastic damages, which are a function of the stock of
emissions in the second period. Emissions depreciate at rate 1-δ, so that δe1 of
first period emissions are left in the second period, and the total stock in the
second period is δe1+e2. 5 First period expectations of the damages are based on
4

Kolstad (1996a), Ulph and Ulph (1997), Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000), Ingham and
Ulph (2005) all use this model.
The extent to which period 1 emissions affect period 2 is determined by δ. If δ=0, the
pollutant is a flow pollutant – it completely dissipates. If δ>0, the pollutant has stock
characteristics – it accumulates in the environment and increases the marginal harm from
5

emissions in later periods. More formally,

∂θ

∂e1



∂θ
> 0, if δ > 0, and=
0,=
if δ 0.
∂e1
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the information set ỹ. Before the second period the actor will receive new
information, y, which allows him to revise his estimate of the damages and choose
e2 accordingly. Discounting between periods is omitted for simplicity.
We can write down this problem as:






max u ( e1 ) + E y max Eθ| y v ( e2 ) − θ (δ e1 + e2 )   ,
e1 ≥ 0
e2 ≥ 0 


second period choice given new information 


(1)

where the actor gets utility u and v from emissions in periods 1 and 2.6 Emissions
in the second period cannot be less than zero, so that any remaining stock of
emissions from first period activity cannot be reversed. Learning is reflected by
the choice of second period activity after new information y is revealed.
Equation (1) says that we want to choose emissions in period 1 to maximize
period 1 utility plus the expected value of period 2 utility given that we will make
a choice about period 2 emissions with better information. The internal expected
value term in the second term reflects that second period choice given new
information. The external expected value in the second term reflects current
expectations about this second period choice. The central idea in (1) is that we
want to know how to choose period 1 emissions given flexibility in period 2. We
cannot simply use the expected value of emissions as of today. Instead, we have
to consider the expected value as of today given a future choice based on new
information.
Note that (1) contains an important simplification, which is that there are no
sunk abatement costs. Reducing emissions in (1) just requires doing less.
Reducing emissions, however, often requires expending capital on abatement
technology. If harm ends up being low, those expenditures are wasted. For
example, if climate change turns out to be not so bad, money spent on carbon
capture and storage will have been wasted as this technology has no beneficial
effects other than reducing carbon in the atmosphere. In a more complete model,
6

Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) write the utility in the

second period as nonseparable in damages: v [ e − θ ( δ e + e )] . I use an additively separable form
2

1

2

because the central case considered here is where the damages fall on third parties. Separability is
a natural assumption in this case.

6

there would be offsetting sunk costs: emissions of pollutants in period 1 are sunk
because of the irreversibility constraint; abatement resources spent in period 1 are
sunk because these resources cannot be immediately redeployed. The two
irreversibilities, and any resulting desire to preserve flexibility, go in opposite
directions. To keep the problem simple, we just consider sunk emissions. 7
3.

Solution
3.1

As a consumer problem

Start by considering the solution to (1) where the actor faces all of the costs
and benefits from actions. Although such an actor might be taken to be a
government planner, it can also be an individual who gets the benefits and bears
the costs of his actions. The clear-cutting example used by Arrow and Fisher
(1974) might be an example. The owner of the property will receive both the
benefits of development and the loss of the virgin forest, so he appears to bear all
of the costs and benefits of his actions.
In this situation, the actor chooses emissions in the first period, e1, to
maximize (1). The question is whether the emissions are higher or lower than
without irreversibility and/or learning. Irreversibility is reflected in the constraint
that e2 ≥ 0. The effect of this constraint is relatively straightforward. The prospect
of irreversible harm will reduce emissions in the first period. If the irreversibility
constraint binds in some states of the world, this increases the expected marginal
damages from period 1 emissions, making it desirable to reduce period 1
emissions as compared to the case where there is no such constraint. The size of
the effect depends on the likelihood that the constraint binds – that in the future
we will want to reduce the stock by emitting a negative amount. This depends on
damages and on the depreciation rate. The greater the likelihood of high damages
for a given stock and the lower the depreciation rate (higher δ in the notation in
(1)), the more likely the irreversibility constraint binds.
Learning is reflected by the flexibility to choose second period emissions
given new information y. The effect of learning is ambiguous. It may increase
first period emissions because it lowers expected harm from second period
emissions. If we expect to know more about the effects of emissions in the future,
we can choose the level of emissions in the future more intelligently, so expected
7

Kolstad (1996a and 1996b) addresses the dual-sided problem.
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harm in the second period as of the first period is lower. It may, on the other hand,
reduce first period emissions because lower first period emissions preserve
flexibility, giving the information greater value.
Epstein (1980) provides a complete characterization of the solution. Define
π y as the updated probability distribution for values of θ given new information
y. Epstein (1980) shows that if the marginal value of the second term in (1) with
respect to first period emissions is concave with respect to π y , the prospect of
learning reduces first period emissions and if it is convex, learning increases first
period emissions. It is not easy, however, to develop an intuition for concavity of
marginal second period utility with respect to updated information.
As a result, solutions to (1) have focused on special cases. For example,
Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) show that for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
utility in period 2, learning reduces first period emissions if and only if the
measure of relative risk aversion is between zero and 1. Ulph and Ulph (1997)
consider the case where both v(e) and θ are quadratic. 8 In this case, the prospect
of learning increases first period emissions. 9
Regardless of the details of the solution, if the actor bears all of the costs
and benefits of his actions, the choice will be socially optimal. When there are no

The damage function θ is fixed and known in their model. Uncertainty comes about
through a random multiplier on damages.
8

9

Other approaches to modeling the problem do not yield simple results either. For
example, Pindyck (2000) considers a continuous time model with uncertainty both with respect to
emissions (e.g., how the stock evolves for a given flow) and damages and with irreversible
damages and abatement expenditures. Damages in his model are a quadratic function of the stock
of pollutant and are uncertain because of an uncertain damage parameter that acts on the stock.
There are no available closed form solutions to this model. Balikcioglu, Fackler, and Pindyck
(2011) provide numerical solutions to this problem and show that policies are adopted later if
uncertainty increases or depreciation is greater (so that the policy is less irreversible). Keller,
Bolker, and Bradford (2004) use a computational model of the economy with the possibility of a
sudden irreversible harm such as the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. In one of their cases, they
compare abatement when there is learning to when there is no learning. They find under their
parameterization that abatement decreases when there is learning, indicating that the value of
flexibility with respect to abatement capital is greater than the value of flexibility regarding the
irreversible harm.
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identifiable externalities, we can think of (1) as an ordinary problem of consumer
or producer choice. Actors regularly face these sorts of problems.
3.2

Taxation

Suppose that the actor in (1) does not bear second period harm so that (1) is
a model of an externality such as climate change. The actor will emit too much
because he does not consider the effects of his activities. In deciding on first
period emissions, he considers only the first term in (1). The standard Pigouvian
tax solution to externalities is a tax equal to the marginal harm from the activity.
The questions whether this solution applies in the present context.
Consider a charge, such as a fine, imposed in second period equal to the
harm Eθ| y θ (δ e1 + e2 )  . The actor facing this charge will fully take into account
all the costs and benefits of the activity. The actor will receive his own utility in
each period, u(e1) and v(e2) and in the second period face a fine equal to
Eθ| y θ (δ e1 + e2 )  . Therefore, the actor will maximize (1) and make the same
choices as in the case with no externality.
When we impose a second period charge or a fine, the actor, in period 1, has
to determine his actions based on the information available in period 1. In
particular, when there is a second period fine equal to actual harm, the polluter
must determine how first period emissions change the expected value of the fine
given current information and knowing that he will learn more and have the
flexibility to adjust his behavior in the second period. That is, the actor in the first
period chooses emission faced with the marginal expected fine. A first period tax
equal to this amount – marginal expected harm from emissions – will, therefore,
have same effect as second period fine. 10
To compute the tax, let e2* be the polluter’s choice of second period
emissions given the information available in the second period and subject to an
additional charge for the harm that those emissions cause. Note that e2* is a
10

One difference is that a tax equal to the expected value would provide a certain cost for
polluting while a fine equal to actual harm would be uncertain. If the actor is risk averse, the
resulting behavior may be different. In the model used here, where utility is linear in damages, this
should not affect the result. In more general models, we would want to impose a charge equal to
the dollar equivalent expected utility costs from the pollution.
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function of e1 and δ because δe1 affects the marginal harm from emissions in the
second period, and it is a function of v because it is determined as part of the
second period maximization. The tax is the (present value of) expected marginal
harm from first period emissions Eθ| y θ ' (δ e1 + e2* )  . With this tax, the result
would be the same with the fine in the second period: the polluter would fully
take the expected externality into account when deciding on emissions in time 1.
The period 2 tax is simpler. New information y is revealed and θ is
correspondingly updated. The polluter need only be charged the marginal harm
from emissions in period 2: θ ' (δ e1 + e2 ) . This is just the standard Pigouvian tax
with the exception that harm depends on the stock of prior emissions, δe1. Given
this tax, the polluter will make the optimal decision in period 2.
The conclusion, therefore, is a tax based on expected marginal harm from
emissions causes the actor to make the same choices as an actor who fully
internalizes the harm. An actor who fully internalizes the harm has to make
choices in the first period based on this expectation so a tax equal to this amount
produces the same result.
3.3

Property rights and tort liability

It is helpful in considering the results discussed above to compare
Pigouvian taxes to property rights and tort liability. Even if the actor does not bear
the harm, the actor will make the socially optimal choice if property rights are
complete so that the individuals who do bear the harm can charge the polluter.
Coase (1960). Consider the dam example, where the harm is water run-off onto a
neighbor’s land, flooding it and reducing its value. If the actor had to pay for this
use of the neighbor’s land, the actor would face a charge of Eθ| y θ (δ e1 + e2 )  , the
harm that he has caused. The actor will bear the full social consequences from his
action, and the individual optimization will again equal social optimization. As
Coase emphasized, if property rights are complete (and bargaining does not fail
because of transactions costs), decisions will be socially optimal.
Tort liability for actual harm Eθ| y θ (δ e1 + e2 )  , also solves the problem. 11
Tort liability is simply a variant of a fine except that the payment is to the harmed
11

I generally use strict liability as the example of tort liability. Strict liability imposes a
charge equal to harm regardless of the care level taken by the polluter. Negligence, on the other
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party rather than the government (and enforcement is private instead of public).
The individual, expecting a charge equal to actual harm will maximize (1),
achieving the social optimum. In some situations, such as nuisances, a tort suit
can result in an injunction against the harm-causing activity. In this case, tort
liability effectively creates a property right: the actor cannot cause the harm
without negotiating and obtaining permission from the harmed party.
Suppose that because of concerns about liquidity or bankruptcy, the
government required polluters to prepay expected tort liabilities such as by
posting a bond, or purchasing insurance. The payment at time 1 for a unit of
emissions would be equal to the marginal expected harm given the information
known at time 1, Eθ| y θ ' (δ e1 + e2* )  , which is the same as the Pigouvian tax. If a
polluter prepays this amount, he will internalize the harm. In fact, we can think if
Pigouvian taxes as prepaid tort liability, where the payment is to the government
rather than the harmed party.
We can, therefore, think of the three instruments, taxes, torts (or fines), and
property rights as substitute mechanisms for decentralizing decision-making. The
choice among the three instruments will be based on considerations of
administrative feasibility, enforcement costs, and similar considerations. 12 For
example, in some respects, tort liability seems like the simplest system because
we wait until there is actual harm before imposing sanctions. We do not have to
compute expected harm. On the other hand, tort liability requires tracing harm to
individual tort-feasors. If the harm occurs long after the pollution or is dispersed
and due to a large number of actors, tort liability may not be feasible. Similarly,
property rights are effective in many contexts but may be difficult to use in other
situations, such as when the harm is dispersed. It is likely impossible, for

hand, imposes a charge equal to harm if and only if the care level is suboptimal. Taxes equivalent
to negligence could also be considered but would be more complex.
12

See Kaplow (2011) and Weisbach (2011) for discussions of the administrative
considerations in choosing between a property-type regime and taxation. Shavell (2011) discusses
the choice between torts and taxation and concludes that for broad-based pollution problems, such
as climate change or emissions into a large body of water, taxes may be preferred whereas for
traditional nuisances, tort liability is preferred. In subsequent work, he notes that an advantage of
tort liability is that the government needs only to measure actual harm, reflecting similar reasoning
to that in the text. Shavell (2012).
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example, to create property rights in the context of climate change, and we have
to instead rely on administrative surrogates, such as cap and trade systems.
4.

The precautionary principle

We can now ask whether the optimal Pigouvian tax is consistent with the
precautionary principle. As noted, the precautionary principle is one of the
primary legal tools for answering questions about the timing of pollution and
abatement activities. The precautionary principle is embodied in numerous
treaties and court decisions, although it is accepted much more broadly in Europe
than in the United States. 13
While the precautionary principle is widely used in environmental law,
there is, unfortunately, no single meaning of the term, so there may be no single
answer to whether it is consistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Different versions
make different demands on environmental policy. I will present what I view as the
central precautionary principle and then alternative interpretations.
4.1

The central precautionary principle

I take as the central claim of the precautionary principle that we should take
additional care when there is risk of harm. This means reducing pollution or other
activities which have the potential to cause harm more than is required through
the use of expected values, such as those used in standard cost-benefit analysis.
That is, I take the precautionary principle as saying that we should use something
other than cost-benefit analysis and should not merely compare expected marginal
benefits to the expected marginal harms.
Many but by no means all invocations of the precautionary principle seem
to have something like this in mind, although statements of the precautionary
principle are rarely clear on this issue. For example, the United Nations
commissioned a body to study the precautionary principle, the World
Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (which is
part of UNESCO). It defined the precautionary principle as stating that “when
human activities lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible
but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm.” COMEST
13

The United States, as a signatory to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, has
accepted it in some contexts.
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(2005) Morally unacceptable harm is defined broadly to include threats to human
life or health, so it includes just about any harm. The statement of the needed
precautions contains no reference to costs. This version, therefore, would seem to
require precautions well above those required through the use of expected
values. 14 Another example can be found in the Final Declaration of the First
European Seas at Risk Conference, which says that if “the ‘worst case scenario’
for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the
safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place.” Proceedings of the First
European Seas at Risk Conference, Annex I (1995).
Academics have posed a similar interpretation of the precautionary
principle. Richard Stewart formulated a version of the precautionary principle
(but did not endorse it) as stating that “activities that present an uncertain
potential for significant harm should be prohibited unless the proponent of the
activity shows that it presents no appreciable risk of harm.” Stewart (2002)
Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000), Gollier and Treich (2003) and Sunstein (2006)
attempt to ground the precautionary principle in option analysis. As quoted in the
introduction, Sunstein would require regulators to reduce emissions to preserve
flexibility when there are irreversible losses and uncertainty about the timing and
likelihood of the loss. Gollier, and co-authors base the precautionary principle on
a model similar to (1). They argue that the government ought to mandate
precaution in circumstances where the solution to (1) is lower first-period
emissions as compared to the case where there is no learning and no
irreversibility.
We can say from the analysis above that this version of the precautionary
principle is inconsistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes should not
be raised above an amount calculated using expected values because of
precautionary motives. The reason is that Pigouvian taxes decentralize decisionmaking by forcing actors to face the full costs of their choices. Actors facing the
full social costs of their choices will take precaution where appropriate. Once we
have imposed a Pigouvian tax, it is as it we have complete property rights and the
actions at issue are like other actions chosen in functioning markets. To the extent

14

The Commission, however, hedged this strong statement by stating that actions should
be chosen that are proportional to the harm and with consideration of their positive and negative
consequences, making it unclear of the extent to which their version of the precautionary principle
is inconsistent with the use of expected values.
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we interpret the precautionary principle in this manner, there is no tax
precautionary principle.
This can be seen in the optimal tax, Eθ| y θ ' (δ e1 + e2* )  . It is equal to the
expected harm from emissions in the first period. It is not adjusted upward to
ensure additional precaution. Indeed, adjusting the tax upward to so that actors
take additional precaution would lead to sub-optimal activity. Individual actors
facing the optimal tax will already take appropriate precautions.
4.2

Other interpretations

There are a number of other possible interpretations of the precautionary
principle. I highlight three here.
Use expected values. Although one of the central reasons for the
precautionary principle seems to be the claim that we should use something other
than standard risk analysis using expected values, some versions of the
precautionary principle seem to merely require the use of expected values; they do
not explicitly require additional precaution. The goal seems to be to prevent
opponents of environmental action from using uncertainty as an argument for not
acting. For example, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
(1992), states:
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) is similar, stating
that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing action. The Wingspread declaration,
one of the most well-known statements of the precautionary principle, is
consistent with this view. It states that “when an activity raises threats of harm to
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if
some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”
Wingspread (1998).
If the precautionary principle is interpreted this way, it is not inconsistent
with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes are calculated using expected
values, so they do not ignore uncertainty or allow uncertainty to be an excuse for
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not imposing a tax. Indeed, if there is a small probability of a large harm, the
expected harm might be large and the resulting tax high.
Procedural versions. Some versions of the precautionary principle are
procedural. Polluters often may have better information than the public about the
likely harms from an activity. If the public does not know about the harms, it may
be difficult to determine the appropriate level of regulation. By assuming the
worst in this situation and, therefore, threatening to regulate, the public can force
disclosure of the information. Although it is never, to my knowledge, specified,
presumably once the private information is disclosed, all that is required is
standard cost-benefit analysis (unless, say, the central version of the precautionary
principle applies in addition to the procedural version). The Wingspread
declaration is an example of the procedural version of the precautionary principle.
It states that in the context of applying the precautionary principle, “the proponent
of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”
To the extent that the precautionary principle is merely procedural, it is not
inconsistent with setting taxes based on expected values. If there is an information
problem in which private parties have information about expected harm not
currently available to the government, it will similarly affect the computation of
taxes and regulations.
Ambiguity aversion. Finally, some versions of the precautionary principle,
such as those found in von Schomberg (2006) and Gardiner (2006), appear to be
grounded in ambiguity aversion. The argument is that if our knowledge of the
risks from an activity is insufficient to form unique priors we should minimize the
risk of the worst outcomes. We should, in the face of deep uncertainty, take high
levels of precaution. These arguments are based on decision theory, such as
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which in turn is based on experiments on human
responses to ambiguity, such as Ellsberg (1961). (Ellsberg, recall, showed that
individuals will pay less for a bet where they do not know the odds.) Rawls
(1999) can be seen as making a similar claim about how actors would choose
when behind the veil of ignorance.
The analysis of optimal taxes under conditions of ambiguity goes beyond
the analysis here. The evaluation of (1) assumed that we could form expectations,
and it is not clear what the appropriate model would be and what its solution
would look like if we cannot. It is possible that optimal Pigouvian taxes when
there is ambiguity would be higher than otherwise, reflecting precaution, but
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without further and substantial analysis, we do not know. We do not, for example,
know whether the ambiguity aversion seen in Ellsberg-type experiments on
individuals is desirable or a mere behavioral regularity, and without sorting out
this and other issues, we do not know how taxes should be set in these
circumstances.
5.

Extensions
5.1

Instrument choice

The analysis above has implications for the choice between market-based
instruments and command and control regulations. The core claim made here is
that to determine the optimal Pigouvian tax in the context of stock pollutants with
irreversible emissions and learning, we need to know how individuals and firms
solve the optimal timing problem. The information requirements for this are
similar to those required for command and control regulations. Pigouvian taxes in
the present setting have smaller informational advantages than in other contexts.
There is a substantial literature comparing command and control systems to
pricing systems, (which, because of their prevalence, is usually some sort of cap
and trade system rather than a tax). 15 The basic claim is that command and control
requires more information than market-based systems which harness private
information. In their most extreme form, command and control regulations require
the government to specify particular emissions reductions or the use of a
15

A number of papers are collected in Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation
(2007) and Emissions Trading, Environmental Policy's New Approach (2000). The results of
empirical comparisons between command and control and market-based systems are mixed. Most
studies seem to show advantage to market-based systems but the size of advantage is unclear.
There are a number of difficulties in making the comparison. The primary problem is that we have
to compare an existing regulation to a counterfactual. There is no single choice of command and
control or market-based instruments to be the alternative, so even specifying what the
counterfactual should be is not straightforward. For example, there are numerous versions of
command and control regulations, some which are quite rigid and some which are flexible and
resemble market-based systems. If a researcher is to compare how much better, say, the cap and
trade system for SO2 is (enacted in the U.S. in 1990 to control acid rain) than the command and
control alternative, the researcher has to specify what that alternative is. Moreover, determining
what the world would have looked like given this choice involves speculation. As a result, the
precise level of gains (if any) from moving to market-based systems is unclear. Nevertheless,
market-based systems are thought to have an informational advantage over command and control
regulations.
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particular technology for individual firms. The government has to know each
firm’s marginal abatement cost and, moreover, as individual firms develop
technologies, the government has to update the regulations to reflect the new
marginal costs for individual firms.
With a tax, at least in a simple setting, the government does not need to
know the costs of emissions abatement. As Kaplow and Shavell (2002) point out,
if the government announces a tax schedule equal to marginal harm at different
levels of emissions, firms, knowing their own abatement costs and facing this
price will optimize. Moreover, firms can pursue a variety of strategies and are
rewarded for finding low-cost methods of mitigation.
Cap and trade systems are slightly more complex but can achieve the same
results as a tax with the same information. Cap and trade systems establish a price
for the quantity of permits issued through the market for permits. The
government, seeing this price, can adjust the quantity to ensure that the
price/quantity pair is on the marginal harm curve. For example, if for a given
quantity of permits, the trading price of permits is higher than the marginal harm,
the government can issue more permits. The government can also automate this
by setting a schedule permits with specified prices as described initially by
Roberts and Spence (1976). Weisbach (2011) reviews a number of mechanisms
for the designing of cap and trade systems to be the same as a Pigouvian tax.
The possibility of irreversibilities and learning reduces the informational
advantages of pricing systems. The reason is that to set a market-price on
pollutants (either directly through a tax or indirectly through a cap), we have to
know what future emissions will be because the marginal harm from emissions
today depends on the future stock.
The optimal tax on a stock pollutant is the sum of the present value of the
marginal harm from emissions in all future periods. If marginal harm is nonlinear
in emissions, to calculate the harm from a unit of emissions today, we have to
know what emissions will be in the future. This means that we must understand
how individuals solve the timing problem. The tax today depends on what people
do in the future. Factors such as expected learning that change how polluters solve
the timing problem influence the marginal harm from emissions today. Thus, an
indirect evaluation of the optimal timing problem can enter the calculation, even
though this is only to calculate marginal harm.
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In particular, in (1), have to know e2* to set the first period tax. Future
emissions, however, depend on available technology and the choices firms make.
The information required to set a Pigouvian tax in this context is not all that
different from the information required to impose some forms of command and
control regulations. Taxes may retain an advantage in that the regulator only
needs to know the variables that enter (1) (or more realistic versions of (1)) in the
aggregate rather than at the firm level, but the advantage is smaller than in simpler
contexts, such as for flow pollutants.
The information problem makes tort liability seem attractive over either
command and control systems or taxation. Tort liability is equal to actual realized
harm, so the information costs might be lower. We do not have to estimate e2* .
Instead, we can wait and observe actual harm. For many environmental issues,
however, tort liability may have other problems, such as that by the time the harm
arises, the polluter may be judgment proof or that the harm may be sufficiently
diffuse that the costs of bringing suit or tracing the harm to polluters overwhelm
the potential recovery.
5.2

Taxes that do not adjust to new information

It is a widespread trope that taxes should be stable. This is captured in
aphorism that an old tax is a good tax. While it may or may not be true for other
types of taxes, it is not true for Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes should always be
equal to current estimate of marginal harm from activity. If expected marginal
harm changes, the tax rate should change. For Pigouvian taxes, artificial stability
is bad. 16
To consider the issue, we need to consider a three period problem. In (2), I
have modified (1) to add a middle period where we receive new information
16

Ko, Lapan, and Sandler (1992) consider a related problem. They show that first-best
Pigouvian taxes should be adjusted continuously and then examine how best to set rigid taxes.
They do not particularly address uncertainty and learning, however.
Note that most of the literature on the choice between taxes and quantity limits, following
Weitzman (1974), relies on non-adjustment to new information as a source of differences in the
two systems. The focus here is on the level of taxation not on the choice of instruments. For a
discussion of how flexibility and adjustment to new information affect instrument choice, see
Kaplow (2011) and Weisbach (2011).
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about the likely harm and can adjust behavior accordingly. The harm occurs in the
last period, as before. (To keep the notation simple, I assume that all the
information is revealed in the second period; no new information is revealed in
period 3.)

{

}

(2) max u ( e1 ) + E y max Eθ| y u ( e2 ) + E y max Eθ| y v ( e3 ) − θ (δ 2 e1 + δ e2 + e3 )  .
e1 ≥ 0

e2 ≥ 0

e3 ≥ 0

Suppose that we set a tax in the first period based on the expected harm and the
expected choice of emissions given that harm and subsequent information.
Further, suppose that notwithstanding the information revealed in the second
period, the tax is not adjusted. First period actions will be optimal because the tax
is set based in then-available information. In second period, however, the tax is
now too high or too low given the newly-revealed information. From the
perspective of the second period, the actor is no longer choosing optimally. There
would be gain from adjusting the tax in the second period to reflect the new
information.
For example, suppose that we set taxes on carbon dioxide to prevent climate
change, and then we learn that climate change is worse than we expected. If taxes
are not adjusted, they will be too low given the new information, and emissions
will be too high. Welfare will be lower than it could be. Moreover, a polluter
knowing that future emissions will not be optimal may adjust current emissions.
Similarly, if we learn that the effects of emissions are not as bad as feared, future
taxes should go down. If they are not adjusted, emissions will be too low given
their modest damages, and welfare will again be lower than the optimum.
One way to see this is to analogize taxes to property rights. The price of
property varies with market conditions. Taxes, as a substitute for fully-specified
property rights, should similarly vary. For example, if in (2), θ represented harm
to a specific piece of property, as in the dam example, it would vary all the time
and the government would not normally try to limit price changes. The individual
would consider the variance of θ when determining first period emissions and in
the second period would face a price based on the information available then.
What property owner, upon realizing, say, that harms from third party actions are
going to be higher than previously thought would fail to increase the charge for
the harm? A Pigouvian tax is like government assertion of property rights in the
polluted asset – you have to pay the government marginal harm to use the asset.
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The government’s charge for use should vary like other property rights so that the
individual will solve (2).
Although there is a welfare gain from adjusting the tax rate, suppose we do
not adjust it, say because the administrative costs are high. We want to know
whether, if we must have a rigid tax, it should be higher or lower than a flexible
Pigouvian tax. We might set rigid Pigouvian taxes higher than flexible taxes if the
harm from failing to increase taxes when appropriate is greater than the loss from
failing to reduce taxes when appropriate. We might anticipate the failure to adjust
taxes and set them initially at a level that minimizes the costs of rigidity.
While anticipation of this sort might be valuable, the direction of
adjustment is not clear without a greater specification of the problem. The loss
from the tax being higher or lower than optimal depends on both the curvature of
the utility from consumption, v(e2) and on damages, θ. While we may have views
about the curvature of the utility function, the shape of the damage function will
depend on the particular pollutant and circumstances. A rigid tax may be
optimally set higher or lower than a flexible tax depending on the curvature of θ.
5.3

Endogenous technology/information

In the model considered thus far, information arrives exogenously.
Scientists or engineers independently conduct experiments which produce the
information y used to set second period emissions. While some information may
arrive exogenously, much of it will be endogenous to policy. The price on
emissions will determine the incentive to innovate.
Many believe that in climate change, the development of technology is by
far the most important variable because of the very high welfare costs of pure
abatement strategies (i.e. using less) for energy.
Fossil fuels are the
overwhelmingly dominant source of energy and if emissions eventually have to
be near zero to stabilize CO2 in the atmosphere, these sources will have to be
eliminated. Standards of living correlate highly with energy use. Without
replacing that energy, the result would be a severe decline in standards of living.
Therefore, reducing the risks from climate change while retaining modern
standards of living will require substantial technological developments. These will
likely depend on the price placed on carbon.
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Solutions to other pollution problems may depend less on technological
developments – pure abatement may be a more feasible option in many cases –
but technology can make solutions cheaper. The effect of a Pigouvian tax on
technological development will be important in many cases. The question is
whether and how endogenous information affects the tax in period 1.
In a simple setting with a flow pollutant, we should set the tax equal to
marginal harm and not worry about the effects on technology. Once the harm is
priced, environmental technology is just like any other technology for markets
where there is no externality. Although it is now understood that knowledge
spillovers and/or increasing returns to knowledge may require special policies
toward technology such as subsidies for research and development, there is
nothing special about environmental technologies in this regard. Once a (flow)
environmental externality is priced through a tax, general R&D policies that apply
to all areas of the economy should govern. Any additional R&D policy aimed at
an environmental problem would tilt R&D policies away from those with the
highest potential.
This approach may not work in the present context where there are stock
externalities with learning. 17 The problem, like the problem with instrument
choice considered above, is that the tax in period 1 depends on e2* . If we interpret
ei as economic activity in each period, technology will allow increased economic
activity with lower damages, θ. This depends on the technology available in the
second period which, in turn, depends on the expected tax. We cannot separate the
marginal harm from emissions from the tax rate when technology depends on the
tax rate.
To illustrate, suppose we think future technology will be very good. For
example, we might expect to invent a cheap source of carbon-free energy or of
eliminating persistent chemicals from the environment. In (1), we can interpret
17

While there is substantial research on the interaction of environmental policies and
technology, I am not aware of work that incorporates irreversibilities of the sort captured in (1).
Popp, Newell, and Jaffe (2010) provide a survey of recent work. Hart (2008) considers the timing
of carbon taxes with endogenous technology but he uses simple expectations rather than allowing
for future flexibility of the type allowed in (1). He concludes that in the central case Pigouvian
taxes should not be adjusted for endogenous technology but on transition to a tax regime if the
current stock is not optimal, it should be set higher. Because he uses simple expectations, he does
not consider the interaction of tax rate and future behavior, which is central to the analysis here.
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this as having a likely realization of θ that is low, so that e2* is high. If, however,
we set low tax rates because of this expected development, we may not get the
new technology. The development of pollution avoidance technologies might
depend on a high price on pollution.
We can rewrite (1) so that second period harm depends on the tax rates in
the two periods:
(3)

{

}

max u ( e1 ,τ 1 ) + E y max Eθ|{ y ,τ ,τ } v ( e2 ,τ 2 ) − θ (δ e1 + e2 )  .
1 2
e1 ≥ 0
e2 ≥ 0

The internal expected value term in the second period depends on τ1. This means
that we cannot set the tax in the first period, τ1, without understanding how taxes
will affect damages from emissions. Therefore, in this setting, the solution
available in the flow-pollutant setting of just setting the tax equal to marginal
harm, is not available.
The problem is difficult because even though we are solving simultaneously
for the optimal price and technology in (2), environmental technologies will still
likely be subject to general policies regarding technology, such as patent law or
R&D subsidies. Even understanding the direction of the effects – is the optimal
Pigouvian tax higher or lower because of endogenous technology – would require
a complex model.
These considerations point to another advantage of tort liability over taxes.
Because tort liability is equal to actual harm, we do not have to estimate e2* . This
means that we do not have to consider the effects of technology on e2* or how
those effects interact with general technology policies. If we set tort liability equal
to actual harm, the environmental harm is internalized and we can think of the
activity as taking place in a complete market just like other activities. General
policies toward technology would apply.
6.

Conclusion

The question we began with was whether Pigouvian taxes on stock
externalities should take the precautionary principle into account. The answer
depends on which version of the precautionary principle is considered. The
weakest versions simply state that uncertainty about harm should not preclude
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environmental actions. This version does apply to taxes. The optimal Pigouvian
tax considers expected harms. Stronger versions of the precautionary principle
would seem to imply that taxes should be higher than the Pigouvian amount
(expected value of marginal harm) because of the possibility of learning and of
irreversible harm. These versions suggest reducing emissions now to preserve
flexibility in the future. These arguments do not apply to environmental taxes: if
environmental taxes are set at equal to expected marginal harm, market actors will
take appropriate precautions, including if appropriate, abating earlier. Pigouvian
taxes decentralize these decisions to market actors by imposing a price on
pollution.
We also considered a number of extensions and limitations to the analysis.
The central difficulty is that for stock externalities, the optimal tax in the first
period depends on second period emissions, so we have to estimate second period
choices to determine the tax rate. Calculating the tax therefore requires knowledge
of abatement decisions which is similar to the knowledge required for setting
command and control regulations. Moreover, if technology is endogenous,
technology policies and taxes have to be set simultaneous because each depends
on the other.
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